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7 an individual, and on behalf of all others similarly situated

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10

11 SONIA HOFMANN, an individual, and
on behalf of all others similarly situated,

12 Plaintiff,

13 vs.
14

15 DUTCH, LLC, a California Limited
Liability Company; and DOES 1 through
16 100, inclusive,

17 Defendant.
18
19
20
21
22

CASE NO.: 3:14-cv-02418-GPC-JLB

Complaint Filed: September 5, 2014

CLASS ACTION

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION: (1)
GRANTING PRELIMINARY
APPROVAL OF CLASS
SETTLEMENT; (2)
SCHEDULING A FAIRNESS AND
FINAL APPROVAL HEARING;
AND (3) DIRECTING THAT
NOTICE BE SENT TO CLASS
MEMBERS**

Date: January 06, 2017

Time: 1:30 p.m.

Courtroom: 2D

Judge: Hon. Gonzalo P. Curiel

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff
3 Sonia Hofmann (“Plaintiff”), on behalf of herself and the proposed Settlement
4 Class she represents, respectfully moves for entry of an order: (1) preliminarily
5 approving the proposed settlement¹ in the above-captioned class action litigation
6 with Defendant Dutch, LLC (“Defendant” or “Dutch”); (2) scheduling a Final
7 Approval Hearing (sometimes referred to as a “Fairness Hearing”); and (3)
8 directing that notice of the proposed settlement be given to Class Members upon
9 approval of the form and method for providing class-wide notice. At the Final
10 Approval Hearing, the following will be considered: (i) the request for final
11 approval of the proposed settlement, and (ii) the entry of the Final Judgment and
12 Injunction. Plaintiff also intends to apply to this Court for an award of attorneys’
13 fees and reimbursement of expenses to Class Counsel, and an enhancement fee
14 award to Plaintiff for her service as the class representative at that time.

15 After more than a full year of hard-fought litigation, and after participating
16 in a full-day mediation before the Hon. Robert May (Ret.) of JAMS, the parties
17 ultimately reached a settlement on September 11, 2015. The Settlement is believed
18 to be a fair, adequate and reasonable. The Settlement permits participating Class
19 Members (those who complete and return a claim form) to obtain a free Current-
20 Elliott brand tote bag (retail value is approximately \$128.00 each) and a Dutch
21 electronic gift card code valued at multiples of \$20.00 corresponding to the number
22 of Class Products purchased (up to two without proof of purchase and potentially
23 unlimited with proof of purchase), which may only be redeemed at
24 www.CurrentElliott.com.

25 The measure of restitution was not arbitrarily determined; rather, it was

26 _____
27 ¹ The Settlement Agreement is attached as Exhibit 1 to the accompanying
28 Declaration of John H. Donboli (“Donboli Decl.”).

discussed and negotiated at length at mediation with the aid of Judge May (Ret.) and is based on calculations of the amount of foreign-made components in Defendant's jeans products (i.e., the "Class Products") in conjunction with a factoring of the risks of potentially receiving no monetary recovery to the Class at time of trial.

All in all, this Settlement is a fair result for the class. The Parties reached a settlement wherein Dutch, LLC agreed to modify its labeling in the following manner:

Factory	Fabric Origin	Trim Origin	Country of Origin Description as of 1/1/2016
USA	USA	USA	Made in USA
USA	USA	IMPORTED < 5% of Wholesale Value	Made in USA
USA	IMPORTED	IMPORTED	Made in USA of imported fabric and materials

In addition, Dutch agreed to a Permanent Injunction as set forth in Exhibit E to the settlement agreement which states:

'Without admitting any liability or wrongdoing whatsoever, pursuant to California Business and Professions Code Sections 17203 and 17535, the Enjoined Parties, and each of them, shall be enjoined and restrained from directly or indirectly doing or performing any and all of the following acts or practices: representing, labeling, advertising, selling, offering for sale, and/or distributing any Products that fail to comply with the California "Made in USA" Statute.'

If Plaintiff would have rejected the Settlement and continued to litigate this action through trial, there would have been a significant risk that no restitution would have been obtained to the Class given the unsettled nature of California law pertaining to how to properly quantify and measure restitution in false advertising cases (such as this case). In view of this risk, the Settlement is undoubtedly fair, just and adequate.

///

1 **II. NATURE OF THE CASE**

2 The Action alleged that Defendant committed unlawful and unfair business
3 practices by falsely labeling its Jeans (“Jeans”) as “Made in USA” in violation of,
4 *inter alia*, California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) (codified at Cal. Bus. &
5 Prof. Code §§ 17200 *et seq.*) and California’s “Made in USA Statute” (codified at
6 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17533.7).

7 Plaintiff alleged that contrary to Defendant’s “Made in USA” claim, the
8 Jeans were manufactured and/or produced from multiple component parts that
9 were manufactured outside of the United States in violation of California law
10 and/or federal law. Specific to the Plaintiff Transaction, Plaintiff alleged that
11 major subcomponents of Defendant’s Jeans that she purchased were foreign made,
12 including but not limited to the trim, fabric, and/or zippers. Plaintiff also alleged
13 that Defendant’s conduct constituted false advertising and was violative of the
14 California Consumers Legal Remedies Act.

15 Defendant denied and continues to deny Plaintiff’s allegations.

16 **III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

17 On or about June 30, 2014, Plaintiff sent a 30-day notice of violation to
18 Defendant pursuant to the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (the “CLRA
19 Letter”).

20 On or about July 28, 2014. Defendant responded to the CLRA Letter by
21 denying all liability.

22 On or about September 5, 2014, Plaintiff initiated litigation by filing a
23 putative class action complaint in the San Diego Superior Court, styled as
24 *Hofmann v. Dutch, LLC*, Case No. 37-2014-00030115-CU-NP-CTL (the “State
25 Court Action”).

26 The State Court Action originally alleged that Defendant violated various
27 California laws, including California Business & Professions Code § 17200 *et seq.*;
28

1 California Business & Professions Code § 17533.7; and the California Consumers
2 Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, *et seq.* (“CLRA”) as it relates to
3 Defendant’s use *in California* of the statement “Made in U.S.A.” on packaging for
4 its Jeans that contained less than 100% domestic content. These claims extended
5 to Plaintiff and all other members of the putative California class.

6 On or about October 9, 2014, Defendant removed the State Court Action to
7 federal court (hereinafter simply referred to as the “Action”) and simultaneously
8 filed its Answer. [Docket No. 1].

9 On or about November 18, 2014, an Early Neutral Evaluation Conference
10 was held before the Hon. Magistrate Judge Jill L. Burkhardt. [Docket No. 6].

11 On or about December 17, 2014, Defendant filed a motion for judgment on
12 the pleadings (“MJOP”) based on principles of federal preemption. [Docket No.
13 12].

14 On or about January 30, 2015, Plaintiff filed her Opposition to the MJOP,
15 which took significant time and time and effort to prepare. [Docket No. 17].

16 In addition, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike extrinsic evidence set forth in
17 MJOP. [Docket No. 18].

18 In addition to the law and motion practice detailed above, Plaintiff also
19 committed a considerable amount of time to propounding extensive written
20 discovery to Defendant and preparing for mediation in March, which led to
21 significant guideposts being established towards resolution that were further
22 negotiated over the following six months. Included in this time was the creation of
23 a viable damages/restitution model that required obtaining and analyzing detailed
24 summaries of Defendant’s cost, pricing, sales, and labeling information for its
25 jeans products (i.e., the “Class Products). This evaluation (done in conjunction
26 with Plaintiff’s counsel’s consultant/expert, not disclosed to Dutch, LLC) was also
27 necessary so the Plaintiff’s counsel and Plaintiff could not only properly evaluate
28

1 the case for purposes of mediation, but also so Plaintiff could begin preparing and
2 generally outlining Plaintiff's motion for class certification. At the same time,
3 Defendant undertook significant investigation to determine the validity of
4 Plaintiff's claims.

5 **IV. CLASS DEFINITION**

6 Plaintiff agreed to settle this Action on behalf of a class of similarly situated
7 persons in California who purchased in California or through a website maintained
8 by Dutch, LLC, Defendant's Current-Elliott jeans product that contained any
9 foreign-made component parts that was labeled as "MADE IN USA" or "MADE
10 IN THE USA" (the "Jeans"), from September 5, 2010 to December 31, 2015, for
11 non-commercial use (the "Class Members"). Excluded from the Settlement Class
12 are all persons who are employees, directors, officers, and agents of Defendants or
13 its subsidiaries and affiliated companies, as well as the Court and its immediate
14 family and staff. (Donboli Decl., ¶ 5; Exhibit "1" thereto at ¶¶ A.7, A.28.)

15 **V. SIZE OF CLASS**

16 In preparing for the mediation which led to the settlement, Dutch provided
17 Plaintiff discovery responses that disclosed the total number of units sold of Class
18 Products, which was 396,652, and net sales, which was \$30,899,951.82. This
19 undoubtedly is a significant sized class under any definition of the phrase.

20 **VI. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT**

21 The Parties agreed to a proposed settlement that, if approved by this
22 Honorable Court, will result in dismissal of the Action with prejudice and the
23 provision of certain benefits to the members of the Class. Under the terms of the
24 Settlement Agreement, if the settlement is granted final approval status by the
25 Court, Defendant will distribute a Current-Elliott brand tote bag (with a retail value
26 of approximately \$128.00 each) plus electronic gift card codes redeemable on
27 www.CurrentElliott.com only and loaded with values of multiples of \$20.00
28

1 corresponding to the number of units of Class Products purchased during the Class
2 Period to participating Class Members (those who complete and return a claim
3 form or those who elect to submit an online claim form). (Donboli Decl., ¶ 6; Exh.
4 1 at ¶¶ D.2, F.3.) Any Class Member who completes a Claim Form to attest to his
5 or her purchase of a qualifying Class Product during the Class Period shall receive
6 the restitution detailed above. (Donboli Decl., ¶ 6; Exh. 1 at ¶ D.2.)

7 The measure of restitution was not arbitrarily determined; rather, it was
8 discussed and negotiated at length at mediation with a highly respected mediator,
9 retired Judge Robert May, and after and is based on calculations of the amount of
10 foreign-made component parts in the Class Products in conjunction with a
11 factoring of the risks of potentially receiving no monetary recovery to the Class at
12 time of trial. (Donboli Decl., ¶ 6(a).)

13 The settlement also has a charitable contribution component which came
14 from a suggestion of Judge May. Dutch is making charitable donations totaling
15 \$250,000 over a period of up to five (5) years (beginning with calendar year 2015)
16 to particular charities. (SA § D3; Donboli Decl., ¶ 7.) Dutch has been made aware
17 of Ninth Circuit legal authority that requires a sufficient nexus between the
18 charitable purpose of the charity and the objectives of the underlying statutes (i.e.,
19 consumer protection statutes in this Action) but also notes that its consumer
20 demographic is mostly women. Dutch made its first charitable donation in the
21 amount of \$50,000 to Step Up Women's Network (suwn.org) in 2015. For the
22 remaining \$200,000 over the remaining four years, Dutch will donate money to a
23 scholarship endowment it will set up at a non-profit university's Consumer Science
24 Department, such as that which exists at California State University, Northridge.
25 The website for the University's Consumer Science Department's Consumer
26 Affairs sub-department is: [http://www.csun.edu/health-human-](http://www.csun.edu/health-human-development/family-consumer-sciences/consumer-affairs)
27 [development/family-consumer-sciences/consumer-affairs](http://www.csun.edu/health-human-development/family-consumer-sciences/consumer-affairs). (Donboli Decl., ¶ 7.)

1 The settlement will be administered by a professional Claims Administrator
2 to administer the claims and payment process. Defendant and/or the Claims
3 Administrator shall also obtain an appropriate URL specifically to handle the
4 Settlement process, such as *currentelliottsettlement.com* (the “Settlement
5 Website”). (Donboli Decl., ¶ 8; Exh. 1, at ¶¶ A.29, F.3). The Claims Administrator
6 shall report any invalid claims and all such determinations of invalidity to both
7 Class Counsel and Defendant’s counsel in a timely manner. (Donboli Decl., ¶ 8;
8 Exh. 1, at ¶ F.5.)

9 Class Counsel shall also seek confirmation by this Court, at that time, of a
10 single \$5,000.00 payment as an incentive award to Plaintiff Sonia Hofmann for
11 serving as the class representative. Class Counsel intends to file and have heard a
12 motion for the recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs to be approved by this
13 Honorable Court, including all reasonable fees, costs and expenses related to
14 Plaintiff’s prosecution of the Action. The parties agreed to a “*not to exceed*”
15 amount in the amount of \$175,000.00. Defendant agreed not to oppose these
16 requests as long as the requested amounts are at or below the above-stated
17 amounts. (Donboli Decl., ¶ 9; Exh. 1, at ¶¶ G.1, G.4.)

18 **VII. NOTICE AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE SETTLEMENT**

19 Upon entry of the Preliminary Approval Order, Defendant, in cooperation
20 with its professional Claims Administrator, shall take the following actions:

- 21 1. Defendant shall direct the Claims Administrator to mail the Notice to
22 any and all members of the Settlement Class to the extent that
23 Defendant possesses such information in its corporate records.
24 Defendant shall provide this information to the Claims Administrator
25 within 20 days of entry of the order granting Preliminary Approval.
26 The Claims Administrator shall thereafter be tasked with mailing the
27 Postcard Notice (in the form attached to Exhibit F of the Agreement
28

- 1 of Settlement) to the potential class members.
- 2 2. Defendant shall publish the Short Form Notice (in the form attached
- 3 as Exhibit B to the Agreement of Settlement) at its discretion to
- 4 reasonably cover the maximum number of consumers of Defendant’s
- 5 jeans products.
- 6 3. Defendant shall provide notice of the settlement on its homepage
- 7 (www.currentelliott.com) with a hyperlink that will send consumers
- 8 directly to the Settlement Website.

9 (Donboli Decl., ¶¶ 10-14; Exh.1, at ¶¶ E.1 – E.6.)

10 These methods are designed to meaningfully reach the largest possible

11 number of potential Class Members. All costs associated with providing notice

12 and administering the claims, including the costs associated with preparing,

13 printing and disseminating the Notice, as directed by the Court in the Preliminary

14 Approval Order, shall be paid by Defendant (not to exceed \$90,000). (Donboli

15 Decl. ¶ 14; Exhibit “A” thereto at ¶ F.8.)

16 **VIII. THE SETTLEMENT MEETS THE CRITERIA NECESSARY FOR**

17 **THIS COURT TO GRANT PRELIMINARY APPROVAL**

18 **A. The Settlement Approval Process**

19 The law favors settlements, particularly in class actions and complex cases

20 where substantial resources can be conserved by avoiding the time, costs and rigors

21 of prolonged litigation. *Van Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp.*, 529 F.2d 943, 950 (9th

22 Cir. 1976); CONTE & NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11.41

23 (2003) [“By their very nature, because of the uncertainties of outcome, difficulties

24 of proof, length of litigation, class action suits lend themselves readily to

25 compromise.”].

26 Where, as here, the parties propose to resolve the claims of a certified class

27 through settlement, they must obtain the court’s approval. Fed. R. Civ. Proc.

28

1 23(e)(1)(A). The typical process for approving class action settlements is described
2 in the FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
3 LITIGATION §§ 21.632-.635 (4th ed. 2004): (1) preliminary approval of the
4 proposed settlement at an informal hearing; (2) dissemination of mailed and/or
5 published notice of the settlement to all affected class members; and (3) A “formal
6 fairness hearing,” or final approval hearing, at which evidence and argument
7 concerning the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of the settlement is
8 presented. *Id.* This procedure, commonly employed by federal courts, serves the
9 dual function of safeguarding class members’ procedural due process rights and
10 enabling the court to fulfill its role as the guardian of class members’ interests.

11 Plaintiff respectfully asks this Court to grant preliminary approval of the
12 proposed Settlement. At this stage, the Court “must make a preliminary
13 determination on the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the settlement
14 terms and must direct the preparation of notice of the certification, proposed
15 settlement, and date of the final fairness hearing.” MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
16 LITIGATION § 21.632. The Court should grant preliminary approval if the
17 settlement has no obvious deficiencies and “falls within the range of possible
18 approval.” NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11.25.

19 At the next stage of the approval process, the formal fairness hearing, courts
20 consider arguments in favor of and in opposition to the settlement. According to
21 the Ninth Circuit, the fairness hearing should not be turned into a “trial or rehearsal
22 for trial on the merits.” *Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Com’n of City and Cty. of*
23 *S.F.*, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982). “Neither the trial court nor this court is to
24 reach any ultimate conclusions on the contested issues of fact and law which
25 underlie the merits of the dispute....” *Id.* Rather, the inquiry “must be limited to
26 the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the
27 product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties,
28

1 and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable, and adequate to all
2 concerned.” *Id.*

3 **B. The Proposed Settlement is Presumptively Fair and Easily Meets**
4 **the Requirements for Preliminary Approval**

5 Courts generally employ a multi-prong test to determine whether
6 preliminary approval is warranted. A proposed class action settlement is
7 presumptively fair and should be preliminarily approved if the Court finds that: (1)
8 the negotiations leading to the proposed settlement occurred at arm’s length; (2)
9 there was sufficient discovery in the litigation for the plaintiff to make an informed
10 judgment on the merits of the claims; (3) the proponents of the settlement are
11 experienced in similar litigation; and (4) only a small fraction of the class objected.
12 *Young v. Polo Retail*, Case No. C-02-4546 VRW, 2006 WL 3050861, at *5 (N.D.
13 Cal. Oct. 25, 2006); *see also* NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11.41. The
14 Settlement easily satisfies these requirements.

15 **1. The Settlement is the Product of Serious, Informed and**
16 **Noncollusive Negotiations**

17 This settlement is the result of extensive and hard-fought negotiations.
18 Defendant expressly denied and continues to deny any wrongdoing or legal
19 liability arising out of the conduct alleged in the Action. Nonetheless, Defendant
20 concluded that it is desirable that this Action be settled in the manner and upon the
21 terms and conditions set forth in the Agreement of Settlement in order to avoid the
22 expense, inconvenience, and burden of further legal proceedings, and the
23 uncertainties of trial and appeals. Defendant also determined that it is desirable and
24 beneficial to put to rest the released claims of the Settlement Class.

25 Class Counsel and Defendant’s counsel conducted a thorough investigation
26 into the facts of the class action, including diligently pursuing an investigation of
27 the relevant facts. Class Counsel is of the opinion that the settlement with
28

1 Defendant for the consideration and on the terms set forth in the Agreement of
2 Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interest of the Class
3 in light of all known facts and circumstances, including the risk of significant
4 delay, defenses asserted by Defendant, and the potential risk of no monetary
5 recovery. (Donboli Decl., ¶ 4.)

6 Here the litigation has been hard-fought with aggressive and capable
7 advocacy on both sides. Accordingly, “[t]here is likewise every reason to conclude
8 that settlement negotiations were vigorously conducted at arm’s length and without
9 any suggestion of undue influence.” *In re Wash. Public Power Supply System Sec.*
10 *Litig.*, 720 F. Supp. 1379, 1392 (D. Ariz. 1989). [“Counsels’ opinions warrant great
11 weight both because of their considerable familiarity with this litigation and
12 because of their extensive experience in similar actions”].

13 **2. The Settlement Has No “Obvious Deficiencies” and Falls**
14 **Well Within the Range for Approval**

15 The proposed settlement herein has no “obvious deficiencies” and is well
16 within the range of possible approval. All Class members will receive the same
17 opportunity to participate in and receive restitution. It is undeniable that the goal
18 of this litigation, to seek redress for the Class, has been met. (Donboli Decl., ¶ 15.)

19 There is a substantial risk, given the current legal landscape in terms of
20 properly quantifying and measuring damages in cases predicated on violations of
21 the California and/or federal “Made in USA” standards (or false advertising cases
22 in general), that, if this action was not settled, Plaintiff would have been unable to
23 obtain any restitution at time of trial. (Donboli Decl., ¶ 16.)

24 The primary factor that supports resolution at this time, from Plaintiff and
25 Class Counsel’s perspective, are the challenges in quantifying and specifically
26
27
28

1 measuring the amount of restitution to Class Members.² Restitution under the
2 UCL is limited to measurable amounts acquired by a defendant from consumers by
3 means of unfair competition. Section 17203 of the unfair competition law
4 expressly authorizes courts to make “such orders ... as may be necessary to prevent
5 the use or employment by any person of any practice which constitutes unfair
6 competition, as defined in this chapter, or as may be necessary to restore to any
7 person ... any money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired
8 by means of such unfair competition.” As the California Supreme Court held in
9 *Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.*, 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1149 (2003) the
10 “object of restitution is to restore the status quo by returning to the plaintiff funds
11 in which he or she has an ownership interest.”

12 As referenced above, there was a serious risk that Plaintiff would only be
13 able to establish injunctive relief at trial, which would have left Class Members
14 with no monetary relief. In light of the above-referenced risk, expense, and
15 complexity of this case, the parties agreed to resolve this matter as set forth in the
16 Settlement Agreement. (Donboli Decl., ¶ 16.)

17 **3. The Settlement Does Not Improperly Grant Preferential**
18 **Treatment To the Class Representative or Segments Of The**
19 **Class**

20 The relief provided in the settlement will benefit all Class Members equally.
21 The settlement does not improperly grant preferential treatment to Plaintiff or
22 segments of the Class in any way. Each qualified Class Member, including
23 Plaintiff, who files a timely claim, shall receive the aforementioned restitution.
24 Plaintiff will receive no more than any other Class Member who submits a timely

25 _____
26 ² This would require Plaintiff to expend over \$100,000 in expert fees, *at a*
27 *minimum*, to develop a restitution model that *might* be approved by this Court as
28 there is no clear guideline on how to quantify restitution in UCL false advertising
cases. (Donboli Decl., ¶ 17.)

1 claim. In addition, the representative plaintiff will apply to the Court for a modest
2 service award of \$5,000 to the extent permitted by this Court (enhancement fees
3 are at times awarded in the \$50,000 range).

4 **4. The Stage Of The Proceedings Are Sufficiently Advanced To**
5 **Permit Preliminary Approval Of The Settlement**

6 The stage of the proceedings at which this settlement was reached militates
7 in favor of preliminary approval and ultimately, final approval of the settlement.
8 The agreement to settle did not occur until Class Counsel possessed sufficient
9 information to make an informed judgment regarding the likelihood of success on
10 the merits and the results that could be obtained through further litigation. Class
11 Counsel has conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of the class action,
12 including diligently pursuing an investigation of Class Members' claims against
13 Defendant. (Donboli Decl., ¶¶ 3—4.)

14 Here, Class Counsel obtained sufficient information from Defendant after
15 conducting extensive discovery, including serving extensive written discovery and
16 exchanging detailed sales, pricing, and financial information in advance of
17 mediation. Extensive due diligence performed by the parties confirmed the cost
18 associated with each component part in the Class Products, which was then used to
19 calculate the proper measure of restitution.³

20 **C. The “Clear Sailing” Provision Contained in the Settlement**
21 **Agreement is Reasonable and Not a Result of Collusion**

22 As is the case here, it is not uncommon for a class action settlement
23 agreement to include a “clear sailing” provision, in which class counsel agrees to
24 petition for an attorney fee award that will not exceed a fixed amount or a given
25

26 ³ Plaintiff retained experienced class action attorneys in this case to represent
27 herself and the Class. (See Donboli Decl., ¶¶ 18-19 for additional details in this
28 regard.)

1 percentage of the common fund, and the defendant agrees not to oppose the fee
2 petition. (Newberg on Class Actions, *supra*, § 11:24, p. 37.) In one case,
3 *Consumer Privacy Cases*, (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th, 545, objectors to the settlement
4 challenged the “clear sailing” provision in the class settlement agreement as
5 inherently collusive, but the appellate court rejected the argument, holding that
6 “[w]hile it is true that the propriety of ‘clear sailing’ attorney fee agreements has
7 been debated in scholarly circles (see Henderson, *Clear Sailing Agreements: A*
8 *Special Form of Collusion in Class Action Settlements* (2003) 77 Tul. L.Rev. 813,
9 815–816; Herr, *Ann. Manual for Complex Litigation* (4th ed. 2009) §§ 21.662,
10 21.71, pp. 522–524, 533–534), commentators have also noted that class action
11 ‘settlement agreement[s] typically include[] a “clear sailing” clause. . . .’
12 (Alexander, *Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions* (1996) 48 Stan.
13 L.Rev. 1487, 1534.) In fact, commentators have agreed that such an agreement is
14 proper. ‘[A]n agreement by the defendant to pay such sum of reasonable fees as
15 may be awarded by the court, and agreeing also not to object to a fee award up to a
16 certain sum, is probably still a proper and ethical practice. This practice serves to
17 facilitate settlements and avoids a conflict, and yet it gives the defendant a
18 predictable measure of exposure of total monetary liability for the judgment and
19 fees in a case. To the extent it facilitates completion of settlements, this practice
20 should not be discouraged.’” (*Consumer Privacy*, *supra*, 175 Cal.App.4th at p.
21 553, quoting Newberg on Class Actions, *supra*, § 15:34, p. 112.)

22 The Ninth Circuit has been somewhat more critical of such provisions,
23 finding that “‘the very existence of a clear sailing provision increases the
24 likelihood that class counsel will have bargained away something of value to the
25 class.’” (*In re Bluetooth Headset Products Liability Litigation* (9th Cir. 2011) 654
26 F.3d 935, 946-947, 654 F.3d at p. 948.) That court has held that trial courts have a
27 heightened duty to examine such provisions carefully and to “scrutinize closely the
28

1 relationship between attorneys' fees and benefit to the class, being careful to avoid
2 awarding 'unreasonably high' fees simply because they are uncontested.'
3 [Citation.]" (*Ibid.*) A court must still determine the reasonableness of the fee, and
4 must do so whether or not there is an objection presented from the class."
5 (*Consumer Privacy Cases, supra*, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 559⁴; see *Garabedian,*
6 *supra*, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 125 [court retains obligation to award only attorney
7 fees that are reasonable despite agreement of parties that defendant would pay a
8 maximum of \$14,125,000]; *Weinberger v. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp.* (1st Cir.
9 1991) 925 F.2d 518, 520 [In the case of a "clear sailing" agreement, "rather than
10 merely rubber-stamping the request, the court should scrutinize it to ensure that the
11 fees awarded are fair and reasonable."]; *Harris v. Vector Marketing Corp.* (N.D.
12 Cal. 2011) 2011 WL 1627973 [despite parties' agreement to particular service
13 award for named plaintiff, court would determine whether she was entitled to such
14 an award and the reasonableness of the amount requested].)

15 In this case, the settlement was reached after a full day of mediation with the
16 highly-respected Hon. Robert A. May (Ret.) of JAMS. The parties, and their
17 counsel, were in separate rooms throughout the entire negotiations. They only
18 came together at the end of the day, once a full settlement was reached, to clarify
19 some minor remaining issues and to draft the material terms of the agreement for
20 inclusion into a signed Letter of Intent. With respect to the attorneys' fees
21 provision, Defendant only agreed not to contest an award up to a certain amount
22 that represented the attorneys' fees to date and anticipated future fees and costs
23 related to the preparing and filing of the motion for preliminary approval, motion
24 for final approval, etc. and for generally stewarding the settlement to final

25 _____
26 ⁴ While in *Consumer Privacy Cases* the parties agreed that class counsel would petition for no more than \$4
27 million for fees and costs, ultimately the trial court granted an attorney fee and cost award of \$3,018,355.
28 (*Consumer Privacy Cases, supra*, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 552.)

1 resolution. This is no way guarantees an award of the agreed-upon maximum.

2 Moreover, the agreed-upon maximum award amount is not a
3 disproportionate distribution of the settlement. The Ninth Circuit routinely
4 approves a 25% “benchmark” award based on the value of the fund. See *Stanger*
5 *v. China Elec. Motor, Inc.*, 812 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir. 2016). In this case, there are
6 approximately 400,000 class members who can submit a claim for a tote bag with
7 an approximate retail value of \$128 and potentially an unlimited number of \$20
8 gift codes. Even assuming only 5% of the class members submit a claim for just
9 the tote bag, this creates a settlement value of \$2,560,000, at a minimum (which
10 does not even include the value of the gift codes, injunction, or cy pres award).
11 The agreed-upon maximum fees award of \$175,000 is just under 7% of that
12 minimum settlement value. Under the Ninth Circuit 25% “benchmark”, this fee
13 amount is more than reasonable.

14 In this settlement, the class members are receiving a significant value. Each
15 class member, who submits a valid claim, will receive a \$20 gift card code for each
16 Class Product purchased, and a Current-Elliott brand tote bag worth approximately
17 \$128, retail value. Receiving a no-strings-attached \$128 tote bag (a bag that can be
18 used by Class Members if they so desire, re-gifted to others, sold, etc.) has great
19 value especially in a class action landscape mired with coupon only settlements.
20 Additionally, the class members receive the significant benefit of the injunction
21 and assurance that Defendant will continue to label its products in compliance with
22 California law (something that was not happening when the lawsuit was originally
23 filed). All in all, the value the class members receive under the settlement is
24 significant. Furthermore, the agreed-upon maximum amount of fees is not
25 unreasonable. In fact, this Court stated in its April 26, 2016 Order, that \$175,000
26 does not seem like an unreasonably high fee.

27 Therefore, based on the utter lack of any evidence suggesting any collusion
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1 between the parties (because no such evidence exists), the mere inclusion of a
2 “clear sailing” provision in the settlement agreement does not necessary render the
3 settlement or the fees award unreasonable.

4 **IX. THE PROPOSED METHOD OF CLASS NOTICE IS APPROPRIATE**

5 The Court has broad discretion in approving a practical notice program. The
6 parties have agreed upon procedures by which the Class will be provided with
7 notice of the Settlement. The notice is undoubtedly sufficient when, as in this case,
8 it informs potential class members about the specific restitution that they could
9 expect to receive under the settlement, the procedure for objecting, excluding
10 oneself altogether from the settlement, the amount of fees and costs that may be
11 awarded by the Court, and the date of the Final Approval Hearing.

12 This notice program was designed to meaningfully reach the largest possible
13 number of potential Class Members, including publication and on Defendant’s
14 home page of its website. It complies fully with applicable case law that the notice
15 given should have a reasonable chance of reaching a substantial percentage of the
16 Class Members. The notice program contemplated in this Settlement satisfies the
17 requirements of due process, and is the best notice practicable under the
18 circumstances and constitutes due and sufficient notice to all persons entitled
19 thereto. Therefore, the proposed notice procedures comply fully with applicable
20 case law because the notice should have a reasonable chance of reaching a
21 substantial percentage of the Class members. See Manual for Complex Litigation
22 (Fourth) § 21.311 at 291-92.

23 **X. THE SETTLEMENT PROVIDES FOR A MEANINGFUL**
24 **CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION**

25 In addition to the Current-Elliott brand tote bag (worth approximately
26 \$128.00 retail) **and** the electronic gift card code(s) available to Class Members
27 who submit timely claim forms, the settlement requires Defendant to make
28

1 charitable contributions totaling \$250,000.00, to be paid over five years, to various
2 charities. The parties to a class action settlement are lawfully permitted to provide
3 for a charitable distribution as part of their settlement as long as the charitable
4 contribution bears a nexus to the interests of the Class. *See Lane v. Facebook, Inc.*
5 (9th Cir. 2012) 696 F.3d 811, 821 *cert. denied* 134 S.Ct. 8 [requiring that a *cy pres*
6 distribution bear only “a substantial nexus to the interests of the class members”].
7 Dutch made its first charitable donation in the amount of \$50,000 to Step Up
8 Women’s Network (suwn.org) in 2015. For the remaining \$200,000 over the
9 remaining four years, Dutch will donate money to a scholarship endowment at a
10 non-profit university’s Consumer Science Department, such as that which exists at
11 California State University, Northridge.

12 In *Facebook*, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld a *cy*
13 *pres* in a case involving a class of Facebook users who had been subject to the
14 website’s Beacon program. As “direct monetary payments to the class” of any
15 kind were “infeasible,” the settlement provided for the creation of a new entity,
16 the Digital Trust Foundation, that would distribute the settlement funds (after
17 payment of attorneys’ fees and the like) “to entities that promote the causes of
18 online privacy and security.” *Lane*, 696 F.3d at 821. The court found this
19 contained “the requisite nexus between the *cy pres* remedy and the interests
20 furthered by the plaintiffs’ lawsuit.” (*Id.* at 822.)⁵

21 The charitable component of this settlement has the requisite nexus. This is
22 a consumer protection action brought on behalf of the purchasers of jeans (whose

23 ⁵ While this settlement has both a significant restitution component and a
24 charitable contribution component, a settlement that consists almost entirely of the
25 latter has been approved where the class is too large, amorphous and unknown.
26 (See, e.g., *In re Vitamin Cases* (2007) 107 Cal.App.4th 820, 830 [approving
27 settlement of consumer claims that provided funds “to be distributed to charitable,
28 governmental and nonprofit organizations” as the class of indirect purchasers of
vitamins was unknown but extensive, including conceivably “nearly every
consumer in California” during the relevant time period].)

1 customers are predominantly women). For the year 2015, Dutch has made a
2 \$50,000 donation to the Step Up Women’s Network. For the remaining \$200,000,
3 over the remaining four years, Dutch will donate money to a scholarship
4 endowment at a non-profit university’s Consumer Science Department, such as
5 that which exists at California State University, Northridge. Dutch makes
6 women’s jeans, particularly Current-Elliott jeans. This is consistent with the goal
7 of donating to charities focusing on helping and meeting the needs of women in
8 our society. Further, making donations to support the study of and to advocate for
9 consumer science provides direct benefits to the consumer population as a whole.
10 This provision is distinguishable from those disapproved in *Nachshin*, in which the
11 charities selected were not in any way related to the settlement class, (*Nachshin*,
12 663 F.3d at 1040), and *Kellogg*, in which the *cy pres* beneficiary was also not
13 identified. (*Kellogg*, 697 F.3d at 866-67.)

14 An additional goal of a consumer protection action is deterrence or
15 disgorgement. A charitable component such as this ensures that a defendant
16 “incur[s] a minimum liability” and, thus, “shows significant usefulness in
17 effectuating the deterrent and disgorgement purposes of” the underlying cause of
18 action. See *In Re Microsoft I-IV Cases* (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 707, 729. This
19 additional goal is present in this settlement.

20 **XI. CONCLUSION**

21 Counsel for the parties committed substantial amounts of time, energy, and
22 resources litigating and ultimately settling this case. After weighing the
23 substantial, certain, and immediate benefits of this settlement against the
24 uncertainty of trial and appeal, Plaintiff and Class Counsel believe that the
25 proposed settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate, and warrants this Court’s
26 preliminary approval. Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the
27 Honorable Court preliminarily approve and sign the proposed Preliminary
28

1 Approval Order filed contemporaneously herewith to permit the distribution and
2 manner of notice. Plaintiff also respectfully requests that the Court schedule a
3 Final Approval Hearing approximately 120 days from the date this Court signs the
4 Preliminary Approval Order.

5 Dated: October 14, 2016

Respectfully submitted,

6 DEL MAR LAW GROUP, LLP

7
8 By: /s/ John H. Donboli

John H. Donboli

9 Camille Joy DeCamp

10 Attorneys for Sonia Hofmann, an
individual, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated